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Abstract: 
Why are people who live in liberal welfare regimes so reluctant to support welfare policy? And why 
are people who live in social democratic welfare regimes so keen to support welfare policy? The 
article seeks to give an institutional account of these cross-national differences. Previous attempts to 
link institutions and welfare attitudes have not been convincing. The empirical studies have had large 
difficulties in finding the expected effects from regime dependent differences in self-interest, class-
interest, and egalitarian values. This article develops a new theoretical macro-micro link by combining 
the literature on deservingness criteria and the welfare regime theory. The basic ideas is that three 
regime characteristics 1) the degree of universalism in welfare policy, 2) the differences in economic 
resources between ‘the bottom’ and ‘the majority’, and 3) the degree of job opportunities have 
profound impact on the public deservingness discussion and thereby on public support for welfare 
policy. 
  
 
Introduction 
A number of theoretical explanations have been given to the empirical finding that the 
electorate in some countries are in favour of welfare policy while the electorate in other 
countries are much more reluctant. Primarily based on the American experience a number of 
recent studies have emphasised the importance of the degree of ethnic homogeneity (e.g. 
Freeman, 1986; Glazer, 1998; Goodhart, 2004; Alsina & Glaeser, 2004). Another tradition 
explains cross-national differences in support for welfare policy with differences in egalitarian 
values in different cultures (e.g. Lipset, 1996; Graubard, 1986). As we are sceptical about 
these two popular explanations, the article will try to advance the third major position; namely 
that cross-national differences in attitudes towards welfare policy (partly) can be explained by 
cross-national differences in the institutional structure of the different welfare regimes.  
 This latter line of reasoning is prevalent within the comparative welfare state 
literature, which often taken Esping-Andersen’s famous distinction between liberal, 
conservative and social democratic welfare regimes as point of departure (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). The prime examples of these three ideal types are respectively the US, Germany and 
Sweden. Within this tradition it is a prevailing idea that the institutional structure at one point 
in time has a large impact on institutions and welfare policies at a later point in time. This 
path-dependency is partly caused by a feedback mechanism through the electorate. In Esping-
Andersen’s words ‘each case will produce its own unique fabric of social solidarity’ (1990, p. 
58). The idea is even more prominent in Pierson’s pioneering work on ‘the new politics of the 
welfare state’ (2001). Within his work and in the following bulk of studies on ‘the new 
politics’ it is claimed that the conflict between political leaders wanting to change the welfare 
state and a reluctant electorate is one of the most salient in contemporary Western politics. It 
is also claimed that the degree of resistance from the electorate is highly influenced by the 
institutional structures of the welfare state. Naturally, the welfare regime theory is not without 
it critics; especially the existence of more than three regimes has been discussed. However, 
following Esping-Andersen re-examination of the regime theory (2000) we will continue to 
operate with three ideal types. 
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A number of studies have tried to test the institutional line of reasoning by 
analysing survey questions primarily made available by the International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP). At first glance the findings from these studies point in different directions. 
Some find evidence for a regime pattern, especially if they restrict the analysis to the 
countries that come closest to Esping-Andersen’s ideal types (Evans, 1996; Svallfors, 1997, 
Heien & Hofäcker, 1999; Andress & Heien, 2001). Other report that they do not find the 
expected pattern (Bean & Papadakis,1998; Gelissen, 2000; Arts & Gelissen, 2001). However, 
a closer review of the previous studies reveals that the discrepancy to a large extent is caused 
by differences in the items used as dependent variables. The items that measure attitudes 
towards policies that primarily concern poor and unemployed actually seem to follow a 
regime pattern.1 Thus, in terms of support for welfare policy in the ‘narrow’ or ‘American’ 
meaning we have indication of a pattern with low support in the liberal regimes, moderate 
support in the conservative regimes, and high support in the social democratic regimes.  
   Nevertheless, one thing is to find the expected regime pattern in public attitudes, 
another thing is to explain how this pattern comes about. In this latter respect none of the 
previous empirical studies have been very successful. With (often implicit) reference to the 
power resource theory (Korpi, 1983) scholars have looked for different class effects. 
Especially the position of the middle class – believed to form a ‘welfare coalition’ with the 
working class in the social democratic regimes and to form an ‘anti-welfare coalition’ with 
the upper class in the liberal regimes – has been emphasised. But the empirical studies do not 
find such a class effect.  Actually class differences seem to be very similar in the different 
regimes (e.g. Evans, 1996; Svallfors, 1997). Scholars have also looked for effects from short-
term self-interest; especially with reference to the rational choice argument about 
concentrated versus dispersed costs.  Pierson (2001) e.g. point to the fact that the ‘welfare 
clientele’ (those how receive benefits plus public employed) is very big in the social 
democratic regime, moderate in the conservative regimes and low in the liberal regimes and 
use this as an explanation for differences in public support. In most studies there is a positive 
effect from being unemployed (e.g. Svallfors, 1997; Gelissen, 2000; Andress & Heien, 2001) 
but otherwise it has been difficult to find the expected self-interest effects. These 
‘disappointing’ findings for the institutional line of reasoning often lead scholars to emphasise 
the importance of ‘culture’ or ‘dominant welfare state ideology’ (e.g. Andress & Heien, 2001; 
Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003). However, this culture explanation remains a residual 
explanation, which is underspecified. In 1998 Korpi & Palme - being the prime defenders of 
the power resource theory - rightly argue that ‘the empirical testing of the macro-micro-links 
among institutions and the formation of interest and coalitions provides a major challenge for 
social scientists’ (1998, p. 682). 
 In our opinion this “dead end” of the institutional line of reasoning is caused by 
the fact that the grand theories of welfare state development (and thereby also the previous 
empirical studies guided by these theories) have a rather ‘mechanical’ perception of the 
electorate. It is assumed that the welfare attitudes of individuals can be directly deduced from 
long-term class-interests (the power resource theory), short-term self-interest (the ‘new 
politics theory’), or internalised values and norms (the culture theory). These ‘mechanical’ 
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positions stands in sharp contrast to modern election research, where it is broadly recognised 
that voter’s stand on concrete policy issues cannot directly be deduced from their self-interest, 
class-interest, or internalised values and norms (e.g. Merill & Grofman, 1999).  
 In an attempt to rescue the institutional line of reasoning the aim of this article is 
to establish a new theory that explains how characteristics of the three welfare regimes 
influence attitudes towards welfare policies that concern the living conditions of poor and 
unemployed; call it a theoretical construction of the missing link between welfare regimes and 
attitudes or a specification of the intervening variables. At an overall level we will try to 
operate with a more reflexive ‘political man’, who’s policy attitudes are open to different 
perceptions of reality. Such a position fits nicely with studies that have shown that attitudes 
towards concrete policy proposals are highly dependent on the framing of the political issues 
(e.g. Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997; 
Kangas, 1997). The overall idea is that the institutional structure of the different welfare 
regimes influences or – using another terminology - frames the way the public perceives the 
poor and unemployed. Thus, the political preferences of individuals are not exogenous, as in 
rational choice theory, but highly influenced by the institutional structures (see e.g. March & 
Olsen, 1984, 1989). 
 At a more concrete level we base our line of reasoning on a combination of the 
welfare regime theory and the literature on deservingness criteria, which for some strange 
reasons have lived rather separate lives. In the first section we briefly introduce some of the 
main arguments within the deservingness literature and describe the lack of effort to link this 
literature to institutional reasoning. We also present a figure of our theoretical reasoning. In 
the following three sections we describe how three different regime characteristics are likely 
to influence the public perceptions of poor and unemployed and thereby the judgement of 
deservingness and the support for concrete welfare policies. We discuss the impact from the 
degree of universalism/selectivism, the differences in economic resources between ‘the 
bottom’ and ‘the majority’, and the degree of job opportunities. This add up to the overall 
expectation (which without much discussion is taken for granted in previous empirical 
studies) that support for welfare policy is low in liberal regimes, moderate in conservative 
regimes, and high in social democratic regimes; at least when we speak about welfare policy 
in the narrow sense. In the following three sections we try to verify our line of reasoning 
using the World Values Study from 1990. The analysis shows that welfare regimes do 
influence public perception of poor and unemployed, which further influence support for 
welfare policy. In the last section we summarize the main argument and discuss the two 
competing theories. 
 
The five deservingness criteria and public support for welfare policy 
Our understanding of public support for welfare policies takes its point of departure in the 
literature on deservingness. The main effort of this tradition has been to pinpoint which 
criteria the public uses to judge whether a person or a group deserves help. In that regard, the 
studies conducted by Fegin (1972), Feather (1974), Cook (1979), De Swaan (1988), Will 
(1993) and Van Oorschot (2000) are extremely helpful to our purpose. The literature on 
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deservingness seems capable of explaining the pattern of public support for social policy that 
Coughlin found in his pioneering cross-national study (1980). He found what he calls ‘a 
universal dimension of support’ because the ranking of the deserving groups followed the 
same line in all the countries included in his study. The public was most in favour of support 
for old people, followed by support for sick and disabled, needy families with children and 
unemployed. The group given least support were people on social assistance. Petterson 
(1995), Van Oorschot (2000; 2005), Van Oorschot & Arts (2005) and others have confirmed 
this ranking. If we follow the review in Van Oorschot (2000), we arrive at the following five 
deservingness criteria:  
 
1) Control (the less in control of neediness, the higher degree of deservingness). 
2) Need (the greater level of need, the higher degree of deservingness). 
3) Identity (the higher degree of group belonging, the higher degree of deservingness). 
4) Attitude (the more grateful, docile and compliant, the higher degree of deservingness).  
5) Reciprocity (the higher previous or future payback, the higher degree of deservingness).  
 
Both Van Oorschot’s empirical findings on the Dutch case (2000) and the previous studies 
show that the issue of control is especially important. Thus, the key to explain modest 
support for unemployed is the perception that they are much more in control of their situation 
than disabled, sick and pensioners. In De Swaan’s (1988) historical study of the modern 
welfare state, he labelled the criterion ‘disablity’. In Cook’s (1979) study of Americans’ 
views on supporting the poor, she labels the criterion ‘locus of responsibility’. Finally, Will 
(1993) also found that the most important deservingness criterion was the degree to which 
the problems facing poor families were beyond the immediate control of the individuals. 
Naturally, the level of need also plays a part, but within the Anglo-Saxon poverty tradition 
‘need’ is more or less taken for granted, as welfare policy is all about support for those in 
need. The application of the need criterion is more difficult in social democratic regimes 
where everybody are entitled and in conservative regimes where those who have paid 
contributions are entitled. We will return to this question below. 
The identity criterion refers to the importance of feeling a shared identity with the 
groups who are to be supported. Using the label of proximity, De Swann argues that the 
boundary of the area can be defined by kinship relations, by place of residence, or more 
generally, by the boundaries of a certain identity group, like ‘our family’, ‘our town’, ‘our 
church’ or ‘our people’. The question of identity has been given strong attention in recent 
primarily American studies that investigate the link between ethnic divides and public welfare 
attitudes (e.g. Gilens, 2001; Alsina & Glaeser, 2004; see also Quadagno, 1994). These studies, 
however, do not explicitly relate to the deservingness literature and they do not apprehend the 
institutional embeddedness of this identity discussion (see below).    
The attitude criteria refer to the ways recipients respond to public support. De Swann 
uses the term ‘docility’ to highlight that poor who hide their misery and ask for nothing are 
seen as more deserving than those who make impudent demands. Cook uses the terms 
‘gratefulness’ and ‘pleasantness’. Finally, the attitude criteria can be linked to a more general 
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criterion of reciprocity, e.g. such behaviour as ‘the smile of thanks’, but also in a modern 
context actively looking for a job, willingness to participate in re-insertion programmes. 
Oorschot furthermore argues that needy who at the moment are unable to reciprocate might 
fulfil this criterion if they have contributed to ‘us’ in the past or are likely to do so in the 
future.  
Thus, the large support for public assistance to the old found by Couglin and others 
might be explained by the perception that 1) they are not in control of their neediness, 2) they 
belong to ‘us’, 3) they are often grateful, docile and compliant, and 4) they have contributed 
to ‘us’ during their working age. At the other extreme, the low support for the group on social 
assistance is caused by the perception that 1) they could get a job if they wanted, i.e. they are 
in control of their neediness, 2) they do not fully belong to ‘us’, 3) they are often ungrateful, 
and 4) they have often not contributed much to ‘us’ in the past. It is more difficult to see how 
the old and people on social assistance differ in terms of need.  
The task in the following is to theorise how the regime context influences the ability of 
poor and unemployed to fulfil these seemingly universal deservingness criteria. Figure 1 
presents the main causal reasoning, which will be elaborated in the following sections.  
 
 
Figure 1. The theoretical link between welfare regime and cross-national differences in 
welfare attitudes 
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The link between degree of universalism and fulfilment of deservingness criteria  
According to Esping-Andersen (1990, 2000) the three welfare regimes are distinguished by 
differences both in terms of welfare state, labour market, and family structures. But it is 
especially on the state dimension that we can find theoretical inspiration from previous 
studies. Within welfare state literature it is a classic thesis that systems dominated by 
universal benefits and services (the ideal type policy of the social democratic welfare regime) 
and systems dominated by a selective benefits and services (the ideal type policy of the liberal 
welfare regime) generate quite different public discussions and perceptions of recipients. The 
typical coverage of the incidence of long-term unemployment in liberal and social democratic 
welfare regimes is quite different. If we take USA, the country closest to the liberal ideal type, 
the unemployed is covered by a short period with unemployment benefits and after that those 
in need, i.e. those not having private savings or insurances, are covered by selective benefits 
and services such a Mediaid, TANF, food stamps, general assistance etc. In contrast 
unemployed in Sweden, the country closest to the social democratic ideal type, are covered by 
a long period with unemployment benefits combined with a large number of citizenship-based 
services and benefits such as general healthcare, child allowance, basic old age pension, 
housing allowances etc. Means-tested social assistance is available to those who have not 
qualified for unemployment benefits but it only plays a minor role.  
Following Rothstein (1998), the first step of the argument is simply to point to the fact 
that a selective policy that aims to provide ‘the needy’ with economic resources must 
determine 1) who is needy, and 2) how much they need. Therefore ‘the public discussion of 
social policy in a selective system often becomes a question of what the well-adjusted majority 
should do about the less well-adjusted, in varying degrees, socially marginalized minority’ 
(Rothstein, 1998, p.158). The general fairness of the policy is also open to challenge as the 
majority might start asking ‘a) where the line between the needy and the non-needy should be 
drawn, and b) whether the needy themselves are not to blame for their predicament’ 
(Rothstein, 1998, p.159). Relating this argument to the deservingness criteria presented in the 
previous section, one could say that a system dominated by selective welfare policies opens 
discussions of ‘need’ and ‘control’, see Table 1. The identity dimension of deservingness is 
also influenced by this logic connected to selective policy as ‘the very act of separating out 
the needy almost always stamps them as socially inferior, as “others” with other types of 
social characteristics and needs’ (Rothstein, 1998, p. 158). 
 Furthermore, it is obvious that the boundaries between ‘them’ and ‘us’ generated by 
selective welfare policy highlight who benefits from the welfare state (i.e. those who pay little 
or no tax and receive targeted benefits) and who looses on the welfare state (i.e. those who 
pay tax but do not receive any benefits). Thus, the reciprocity of the system will be perceived 
as being very low, which increases the importance of grateful, docile and compliant attitudes 
among those who receive the targeted benefits or services. Finally, this logic of selective 
welfare policy tends to generate vicious circles or even self-fulfilling prophecies because the 
‘needy’, exactly because they are labelled as not been ‘ordinary’ people, alter their behaviour. 
It creates a further division between ‘them’ and ‘us’ and probably makes it more difficult to 
find grateful, docile and compliant attitudes among recipients.  
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Table 1. The effects from respectively selective and universal social policy on different 
dimensions of deservingness  
Dimensions of 
deservingness 
A welfare state dominated by  
selective benefits and services 
A welfare state dominated by universal 
benefits and services 
Need 
  
Open the discussion of whether 
recipients are in need 
 
Close the discussion of whether 
recipients are in need 
Control  
 
Open the discussion of whether 
recipients are to blamed  
 
Close the discussion of whether 
recipients are to be blamed 
Identity 
 
  
Define the recipients as a special group 
distinguished from the well-adjusted 
majority 
 
Define the recipients as equal citizens 
who belong to a national ‘us’ 
Reciprocity  
 
 
Highlight the boundary between those 
who give and those who receive 
Blur the boundary between those who 
give and those who receive 
Attitude  
 
Open the discussion of whether 
recipients receive benefits and services 
with a grateful, docile and compliant 
attitude 
Close the discussion of whether 
recipients receive benefits and services 
with a grateful, docile and compliant 
attitude 
 
 
The logic of a system dominated by universal welfare policy is in all aspects contrary to the 
logic within a system dominated by selective policies. In the Scandinavian systems of ‘Rolls 
Royce universalism’ no line needs to be drawn between the needy and the non-needy. Thus, 
the discussion of need and to what extent the poor and unemployed are in control of their 
neediness becomes more or less irrelevant. As Rothstein argues, ‘welfare policy does not, 
therefore, turn into a question of what should be done about “the poor” and “the 
maladjusted,” but rather a question of what constitutes general fairness in respect to the 
relation between citizens and the state. The question becomes not “how shall we solve their 
problem?” but rather “how shall we solve our common problem (healthcare, education, 
pensions, etc.)?’ (Rothstein, 1998, p. 160). Instead of defining a line between ‘them’ and ‘us’, 
the universal benefits and services actually help define everybody within the nation state as 
belonging to one group. The vicious cycle of selective welfare policy is replaced by a positive 
circle.  
The reciprocity discussion is also suppressed in the social democratic regimes. For the 
majority of citizens it is not an easy task to calculate whether one is net-winner or net-loser, 
even though welfare states dominated by universal policy have been shown to be the most 
redistributive nation states in the OECD area. If the cost-benefit analysis is done at the 
individual level in a given year, the calculation could be manageable. The market value of the 
universal benefits and services received in that year should be subtracted the amount paid in 
VAT, income tax and different duties. But the calculation is complicated and it becomes even 
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more complicated if the cost-benefit analysis is done at the household level and within a 
lifetime perspective. In that case, the amount of VAT, income tax, duties etc. paid by the 
family over a lifetime should be subtracted the value of free education for the children, the 
old-age pension of one’s partner, the likely use of free hospitals, the likely use of 
unemployment benefits etc. The most likely end result is that an ordinary citizen does not start 
to calculate at all.3 So, the point is that the programmatic structure but also the very size of the 
ideal type social democratic regime (see also Korpi & Palme, 1998) blur the boundary 
between net-winners and net-losers, which restrain the reciprocity discussion. Finally, as the 
institutional logic of universalism suppresses the discussion of need, control, identity and 
reciprocity, the attitudes among recipients of benefits and services also become more or less 
irrelevant. Nobody expects citizens – including the poor and the unemployed – to be grateful 
because they receive a basic old-age pension, have access to free hospital treatment, heavily 
subsidised childcare etc. Following this line of reasoning we have theoretical reasons to 
believe that due to institutional mechanisms the poor and unemployed in the liberal regimes 
will be asked to fulfil much harder deservingness criteria than the poor and unemployed in the 
social democratic regimes. Thereby we have established the first part of the institutional 
explanation for high support for welfare policy in the social democratic regimes and low 
support in the liberal regimes.4  
 
The link between degree of generosity and fulfilment of the need criterion  
The degree of generosity and the degree of universalism/selectivism of the welfare regimes 
are often not distinguished clearly from each other – probably because they often go together. 
However, we argue that the degree of generosity has an independent effect on the identity 
discussion. It is a classic thesis that pursuing a welfare policy that allows recipients to 
continue an ‘ordinary’ life style reduces the risk of stigmatising (otherwise) poor and 
unemployed citizens. The basic argument is that reduced differences in economic resources 
between ‘the majority’ and ‘the bottom’ of society generates more similar living styles, which 
as a consequences makes it easier for ‘the bottom’ to fulfil the identity criterion. In the Social 
democratic regimes unemployed use the same childcare facilities, schools, hospitals, nursing 
homes etc. as the more well-off citizens. The generosity of the welfare states also allow 
unemployed to live in ordinary neighbourhoods. Thereby we have a self-reinforcing feedback 
mechanism where policies that generate good living conditions among the potential poor 
produce public support for ‘more of the same’. And the other way around; if those at ‘the 
bottom’ of society is not provided descent economic resources they are forced to have a way 
of living that is quite different from the way of living of the majority. Thereby it becomes 
harder to fulfil the identity criterion and we have a ‘negative’ feedback mechanism on public 
opinion. It is quite symptomatic that the largest discussions about dependency culture took 
place in liberal regimes, which provide the least generous benefits and services (Murray, 1984 
for the US; Dean & Taylor-Gooby ,1992 for the UK). To put it boldly one can argue that the 
lack of identification with the black in USA is not only a matter of black being black. It is also 
a matter of black being poor. 
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 In terms of poverty risk a number of empirical studies have demonstrated that 
the risk tend to be highest in the liberal regimes, in-between in the conservative regimes, and 
lowest in the social democratic regimes. If we take the countries closest to the ideal types we 
find the expected pattern. Measured by Gini-coefficients based on OECD data from the mid-
1990s the disposal income distribution was most equal in Sweden (23.0), less equal in 
Germany (28.2), and most unequal in USA (34.4)(Förster & Parson, 2002, p. 38). If we take 
the percentage of the total populations that have an income below 50 percent of the median 
(equivalence) income we see the same pattern. In Sweden 6.6 percent fell below this threshold 
in the mid-1990, in Germany the share was 8.2 percent, and in USA the share was 17.8 
percent (LIS, 2005). These conventional figures for the whole population also include poverty 
among children and elderly. If we use figures that narrowly measure the poverty risk among 
the group of able-bodied persons in the working age, which is our main concern, the pattern is 
even clearer. Relative poverty rates among the unemployed can e.g. be calculated from the 
European Household Panel Study and the results are convincing even though the extreme 
cases of Sweden and USA are not included. In Denmark, another social democratic regime, 
only 8.1 percent of the unemployed fell below the relative poverty threshold of 50 percent of 
the mean income. In the Germany case the share was 26.8 percent and in Great Britain the 
share was 48.5 percent (Galli, Jacobs & Paugam, 2000, p. 51).  
Thus, on a one-dimensional scale the difference in economic resources between 
‘the bottom’ and ‘the majority’ is high in the ideal type liberal regime, medium in the ideal 
type conservative regime, and low in the ideal type social democratic regime. Thus, we can 
expect an effect, which should make it most difficult to fulfil the identity criterion in the 
liberal regimes and easiest in the social democratic regimes.6 This is the second part of our 
institutional argument.  
 
The link between degree of job opportunities and fulfilment of the control criterion  
It is not only the generosity and the character of the welfare policy in the different welfare 
regime that influence the deservingness discussion. The labour market structures in the 
different regimes are also likely to have a profound impact. Esping-Andersen and a number of 
‘institutional economists’ have shown that the programmatic structure of the welfare state is 
interwoven with the labour market. In his 1990 book, Esping-Andersen described how 
welfare policy creates important structures that influence how workers through early 
retirement can exit from the work force, how workers can claim paid absence from work, and 
how especially women can enter the work force (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 144-61). 
However, his main interest was how these institutional regime differences have influenced the 
transformation from industrial to post-industrial economies (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996, 
2000). The pressure on the industrial production structure comes from external factors such as 
increased economic integration and new technologies and from internal factors such as the 
women’s desire to participate in the work force. 
The most discussed indication of these pressures is the high rates of unemployment that 
haunted most Western welfare states during the 1980s and 1990s. Very generally speaking the 
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situation is that the social democratic regimes have followed a trajectory where new jobs were 
generated in the public sector. It boosted employment considerably, created opportunities for 
women, and prevented declining wages in service jobs. At the same time, an active labour 
market policy was designed to train manual workers for new post-industrial jobs. The liberal 
regimes followed a neo-liberal trajectory where new service jobs are created in the private 
sector. It also boosted employment and created opportunities for women, but at the same time 
inequality increased and a large group of working poor was established. Finally, conservative 
regimes followed a labour reduction route. It did not boost employment in the service sector. 
Instead the male ‘insider’ breadwinner was protected against the risk of unemployment 
through strict job protection and early retirement schemes (Esping-Andersen, 1996).  
Now the point is that these different employment trajectories influence the public 
perception of poor and unemployed. Especially the degree to which poor and unemployed 
groups are believed to be in control of their neediness is influenced by the level of 
unemployment. Therefore the poor and unemployed in the conservative regimes are seen as 
less in control of their neediness than the poor and unemployed in the social democratic and 
liberal regimes where job growth respectively in the public and private sector generated job 
opportunities. Recent empirical studies strongly support such an impact from labour market 
structures. Using Eurobarometer surveys Gallie & Paugam found a clear connection between 
level of unemployment in European countries and the perception that poverty was caused by 
laziness among unemployed (2002, p. 21). Using the World Value Study the same finding is 
reached by Larsen (2006). Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003), using the ISSP role of 
government module, also found a strong connection between level of unemployment and 
support for welfare policy (see also Earley & Matheson, 1999).  
However, it is not only the level of unemployment that matters. The differences in wage 
setting mechanisms in each regime are also likely to have an impact. Poor and unemployed 
are perceived to be more in control of unemployment in countries where individuals are able 
to negotiate the wages themselves. This is possible in liberal regimes, where the importance 
of unions always has been limited and further undermined by the neo-liberal employment 
strategy during the 1980s and the 1990s. To put it boldly, this institutional setting facilitate 
the perception that everybody can get a job in the private service sector if they only are 
willing to reduce their wage demands. This is not possible in social democratic and 
conservative regimes, where the unions still have considerable influence on wage setting – 
especially in blue-collar sectors. So poor and unemployed cannot escape unemployment by 
lowering their wage demands. Finally, the degree of job protection for the ‘insiders’ 
(Lindbeck & Snower, 1988), which is very high in the conservative regimes, also contribute 
to the perception of poor and unemployed being out of control.  Therefore it is no surprise that 
Larsen (2005, p. 62) finds that the share answering ‘that most poor people have very little 
chance of escaping poverty’ is highest in two conservative regimes (Germany, 83 percent; 
Spain, 73 percent). 
Alesina & Glaeser (2004) have rightly argued that the American perception of poor 
having good chances of escaping poverty does not coincide with the facts. Referring to 
Gottschalk & Spolaore (2002), who compare USA and German, and Checchi, Ichino & 
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Rustichini (1999), who compare USA and Italy, reality seems to be that the poor are more 
‘trapped’ in USA than in Germany and Italy. In USA, 60 pct. of the bottom quintile in 1984 
were still in this quintile in 1993 compared to 43 pct. in Germany. In USA, 25 pct. of the 
fathers in the bottom quartile have children who also are in this quartile. In Italy, the share is 
21 pct. To explain this paradox, Alesina & Glaeser refer to different ideologies (p. 76) and 
later to a general negative perception of poor caused by racial divides (133-183). In contrast, 
we point at regime-dependent labour market structures as a more straightforward explanation. 
Job growth in the private service sector and the ability of individuals to negotiate the salary 
might not on average increase the chance of moving out of the lowest quintile but the 
possibilities of getting a job gives the public the impression that each individual has a decent 
chance. 
Thus, based on the argument of structural differences in service sector expansion, wage 
setting mechanisms and job protection, we would expect the labour markets to facilitate 
perceptions of little control of neediness among poor and unemployed in conservative 
regimes, medium control of neediness in social democratic regimes, and high control of 
neediness in liberal regimes. This is the third part of our institutional argument. 
 
Empirical testing 
Above we have established a new theoretical link between welfare regimes and public 
attitudes. The three relevant regimes dimensions were the degree of selectivism, difference in 
economic resources between ‘the bottom’ and ‘majority’, and the degree of job opportunities. 
The ideal type liberal welfare regimes had high scores on all three dimensions and therefore 
poor and unemployed have difficulties in meeting the deservingness criteria. The ideal type 
social democratic welfare regime had low scores on the two former dimensions and a medium 
score on the job opportunity dimension. Therefore the poor and unemployed can easier fulfil 
the deservingness criteria. Finally, the ideal type conservative welfare regime had medium 
scores on the two former dimensions and a low score on the job opportunity dimension. 
Therefore we expect that the perceptions of the poor and unemployed in conservative regimes 
fall in-between the perceptions found in the liberal and social democratic regimes.  
 Now the question is whether we can find empirical evidence for this new line of 
reasoning. The link between welfare regimes (typically measured by dummy variables) and 
support for welfare policy (in the narrow sense, measured by the ISSP-items) is well 
established, see above. The task is to test the soundness of the suggested intervening 
variables. In order to verify our theory we would need comparative data on the dimensions 
deduced from the deservingness literature, i.e. the question of control, need, identity, 
reciprocity, and gratefulness, see Figure 1. Unfortunately such comparative data are simply 
not available. Therefore we will test our argument by using a proxy found in the World Value 
Study from 1990 (not available in the 1999 wave). The data cover the three countries closest 
to the ideal type and other 13 countries of relevance. Thereby we end up with 16 countries 
and 25.679 respondents in the data set.   
 The respondents were asked ‘Why there is people in this country who live in 
need’ and given the four following possibilities; 1) because they have been unlucky, 2) 
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because of laziness and lack of will power, 3) because there is much injustice in our society, 
4) it’s an inevitable part of modern progress. In our opinion people who ‘choose’ to explain 
poverty with ‘laziness and lack of will power’ indicate that poor and unemployed are 
perceived to be in control of their neediness, i.e. they could get a job if they wanted. In the 
other cases the poor and unemployed can hardly be seen as being in control.  However, the 
proxy also ‘taps’ parts of the identity dimension. Explaining poverty with ‘laziness and lack 
of will power’ also denotes that the poor culturally distinct from ‘the majority’, which share a 
common work ethic.  
 Now the first question is whether we can find a connection between welfare 
regimes and this proxy. The second question is whether we can find a connection between this 
proxy and public support for welfare policy. We should expect both of these connections if 
perceptions of control and identity are the intervening variables between welfare regimes and 
cross-national differences in public support.    
 
The link between welfare regimes and fulfilment of deservingness criteria 
If we only consider the three countries closest to Esping-Andersen’s ideal types the expected 
pattern emerges. In USA 39 per cent explain poverty with laziness and will power while the 
share is only 16 per cent in Sweden. With 23 per cent Germany (West) comes in between as 
expected. However, we are also able to show that the expected pattern is present when the 
more deviant cases are included. The 16 available countries are grouped following Esping-
Andersen (1990, 2000). USA, Canada, Great Britain and Ireland make up the liberal cluster. 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and the somewhat deviant case, the Netherlands, make 
up the social democratic cluster. Finally, Germany (West), France, Belgium, Austria, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy make up the conservative cluster.    
 Using a simple OLS model it is estimated that belonging to the social 
democratic cluster reduce the share answering ‘laziness and lack of will power’ with 13.4 
percentage point, see table 2 model I. The liberal cluster is used a reference category. It is also 
estimated that belonging to the conservative cluster reduce the share answering ‘laziness’ with 
5.0 percentage point. Thus, as expected we find a strong effect from living in a social 
democratic regime and a medium effect from living in a conservative regime. The former is 
even highly significant with only 16 cases. The latter effect is significant at 0.25 levels. 
However, the overall regime effect would clearly be significant if we had included regime 
belonging as an ordinal variable. The explained variation in model I is 43 percent.   
 Naturally, not all the cases follow the pattern neatly – then the two dummy 
variables would explain 100 percent of the variation. However, some of the deviant cases can 
be explained by the fact that they differ on the job opportunity dimension. That holds for 
Austria, which in contrast to the other conservative regimes experienced low unemployment 
rates throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, it comes as no surprise that a large share in 
Austria (37 per cent) answer that poverty is caused by ‘laziness’. It also holds for Ireland, 
which until the 1990s experienced some of the highest unemployment levels in Europe. Thus, 
it is no surprise that fewer than expected (from the regime belonging) explain poverty with 
laziness (21 per cent). This argument is formalised in model II, see Table 2. Here we have 
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included level of unemployment (OEDE standardised) as a separate variable. It is estimated 
that one percentage point increase in unemployment reduces the share answering ‘laziness’ 
with 0.8 percentage point. The effect is significant at a 0.10 level (which is acceptable taken 
the number of cases into account). Furthermore, the impact from the original regime dummies 
increase, as expected (from 13.4 to 16.6 in social democratic case and from 5.0 to 5.8 in the 
conservative case), and the explained variation increases significantly (from 43 to 54 per 
cent). These estimates clearly support our argument.  
 
 
Table 2. Prediction of proportion answering in poverty caused by ‘laziness and lack of will 
power’ based on degree of regime belonging, level of unemployment, and ethnic 
fractionalisation (OLS). World Value Study 1990 
Model: I II IV 
Belonging to social democratic regime (dummy)    
 Beta coefficient unstandardised -13.4 -16.6 -14.0 
 Sig. 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Belonging to conservative regime (dummy)    
 Beta coefficient -5.0 -5.8 -4.4 
 Sig. 0.25 0.16 0.30 
Level of unemployment    
 Beta coefficient  -0.8 -0.89 
 Sig.  0.10 0.09 
Ethnic fractionalisation    
 Beta coefficient   10.3 
 Sig.   0.27 
 
    
R2  0.43 0.54 0.59 
N  16 16 16 
 
One could naturally still pose the question whether the regime dummies only ‘taps’ the 
dimensions we have discussed above. The residual culture explanation is not seen as a strong 
competitor, as it does not deliver a better suggestion for the intervening variables. The 
heterogeneity explanation offers more competition. Following Alsina & Glaser (2004) the 
argument would be that the so-called ethnic fractionalisation is low in the social democratic 
regimes and high in the liberal regimes. Thus, the fulfilment of the identity criteria could have 
more to do with ethnic divides than the institutional structure of the welfare regimes. In order 
to control for this objection we have included Alsina & Glaser’s ethnic fractionalisation 
measure in model III. Their figures are based on information from Encyclopedia Britannica 
and they calculate the probability of two randomly selected individuals belonging to different 
ethnic groups (Alsina et. al, 2003). The increase in the share answering ‘laziness’ is estimated 
to be 10.3 percentage points if one goes from at totally homogeneous society (the probability 
of selecting two people belonging to different ethnic groups is zero) to at totally heterogeneity 
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society (the probability of the selecting two people belonging to different ethnic groups is 
one). In the real world the cross-national differences are much more modest. Measured by the 
standardised beta-coefficient (not shown) ethnic fractionalisation is the weakest of the 
variables included in model III. Furthermore, the effects from the regime dummies are not 
seriously reduced (from 16.6 to 14.0 on social democratic dummy; from 5.8 to 4.4 on the 
conservative dummy). One could add more control variables but the limited number of cases 
makes further elaboration more or less impossible. However, the analyses we can make 
support the argument that welfare regimes influence the perception of poor and unemployed.  
 
The link between deservingness and support for welfare policy 
The second task is to test whether the deservingness judgements measured by our proxy are 
linked to support for welfare policy. Unfortunately, the latter questions were measured in the 
ISSP surveys and not in the World Value Survey. However, for 8 countries we can correlate 
the share answering ‘laziness and lack of will power’ with support for welfare policy at the 
aggregated level. For public support we use an additive index of the three ISSP items (attitude 
to ‘redistribution’, ‘provide jobs to all’, and ‘provide basic income’) from the social inequality 
module used in the previously studies that confirm a regime pattern. The result is a strong 
correlation (0.69) at the aggregated level; the larger the share answering ‘laziness and lack of 
will power’ the lower support for welfare policy (Larsen, 2006, p. 90) 
 At the individual level it is possible to the test the correlation between 
deservingness perceptions and support for welfare policy on less fragile data. In a national 
(Danish) sample we have measured two deservingness dimension and public support for 
social assistance. The perceived degree of control was measured by the question ‘How do you 
believe the opportunities are for recipients of social assistance to get into the Danish labour 
market?’ The perceived degree of shared identity between ‘the bottom’ and ‘the majority was 
measured by the question ‘How do you believe the work ethic, i.e. the desire and willingness 
to work, is among claimants of social assistance as compared to work ethic among 
employed?’ In both cases we found a strong connection between these deservingness 
dimensions and public support for social assistance (Larsen, 2006 p. 123-38). Thus, the 
national data confirm that the dimensions discussed above are highly relevant in order to 
explain variations in attitudes towards welfare policy. Further analyses show that these 
connections remain strong and significant when political orientation is taken into account. 
Thus, the measured perceptions are not a simple reflection of basic egalitarian and anti-
egalitarian values (Larsen, 2006, p. 134-35).  
 
Conclusion and discussion 
This article has been an endeavour to rescue the institutional explanation of cross-national 
differences in support for welfare policy. The combination of welfare regime theory and the 
deservingness literature allowed us to specify the link between the macro-level of welfare 
regimes and the micro-level of public attitudes. This combination also allowed us to operate 
with a ‘political man’ where the formation of attitudes was less ‘mechanical’ and more open 
to perceptions of reality. To put it heroically it has been an attempt to provide the grand 
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theories of welfare state development with at better micro-foundation. It is clear that more 
empirically research need to be done in this field. But using the World Value Survey from 
1990 we were able to verify a connection between welfare regimes and perceptions of poor 
and unemployed. We were also able to verify the presence of a strong connection between 
perception of control and identity and support for welfare policy.  
 The article has also been an attempt to establish a competing theory to the 
homogeneity explanation and the culture explanation.  The homogeneity explanation basically 
claims that low support in liberal for welfare policy primarily has to do with the presence of 
ethnic heterogeneity. The argument is primarily inferred from the American experience. The 
claim is that the presence of Indians and the import of slaves simply gave and continue to give 
fundamentally different preconditions for the welfare discussion in USA. This idea is 
widespread among American scholars and supported by studies that show a strong correlation 
between attitudes towards the race issue and the welfare issue (e.g. Quadagno, 1994; Gilens, 
2000). Moreover, this explanation gains more and more influence as recent European 
discussions about immigration sometimes also link-up with the welfare discussions. From 
their study of ethnic fractionalization Alesina & Glaeser (2004) infer that eventually increased 
ethnic heterogeneity will lower the Europeans’ passion for welfare policy (for similar 
argument see also Freeman, 1986; Glazer, 1998; Goodhart, 2004). However, simply by 
turning the argument around one becomes more uneasy about the argument, i.e. to claim that 
higher support for welfare policy in the European countries is caused by ethnic homogeneity. 
Naturally, the USA has had a large minority with a black skin but the European history is also 
filled with clashes between different ethnic groups. The building of nation states had a 
homogenising effect on the one hand; a process that have not been given the same time in 
previous colonies. However, this long process of turning inhabitants of a given area into 
national citizens also established new and persistent divides between the majority and ethnic 
minorities who wanted their own nation state or wanted to belong to another nation state (e.g. 
Bommes & Geddes, 2000). Furthermore, a number of empirical studies have contested the 
link between homogeneity and support for welfare policy (e.g. Banting & Will Kymlicka, 
forthcoming; Taylor-Gooby, 2005). Finally, Alesina & Glaeser (2004) and others may argue 
that the degree of ethnic homogeneity was crucial for establishing different kinds of welfare 
institutions but still they need to take into account that once welfare institutions are 
established they get an impact on their own. It is this institutional feedback on public support 
that has been theorised in the article.  
The second popular explanation of cross-national differences in support for 
welfare policy is the ‘culture thesis’. It basically claims that lower support in USA and other 
liberal regimes is caused by a ‘passion for freedom over inequality’. The argument is inline 
with Lipset’s thesis of an American exceptionalism (e.g. 1996); and the other way around the 
‘culture thesis’ claims that the high support in the social democratic regimes is caused by a 
‘passion for equality’ (Graubard, 1986). This explanation is widespread among Europeans; 
probably because, from a European perspective, it reproduces the ‘nice’ idea about a social 
responsible Europe and a social irresponsible USA. However, the argument contradicts one of 
the very first and strongest impressions Europeans got after crossing the Atlantic. Coming 
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from France Tocqueville described in detail, and was indeed somewhat worried about, the 
‘passion for equality’ that prevailed in USA. Naturally, it was first of all a call for equality of 
opportunities and naturally much has happened in Europe since then. But the overall 
impression is that the liberal regimes are rooted in quite egalitarian cultures. The comparative 
studies that try to measure justice beliefs or level of egalitarianism do not find a distinct 
liberal anti-egalitarian culture (see Larsen, 2000, p. 34-43). Larsen (2006, p. 40) actually 
shows that measured in terms of perception of just wage differences (which probably is the 
most valid and reliable cross-national measure we can establish) the most anti-egalitarian 
attitudes are found in the conservative welfare regimes and not in USA or the other liberal 
welfare state regimes (as Tocqueville would predict if he was still alive). What distinguishes 
Americans and others who live in liberal welfare state regimes is not a general anti-egalitarian 
attitude. Instead we find a specific anti-egalitarian attitude towards ‘the bottom’, which 
(partly) can be given an institutional explanation.  
Finally, our institutional line of reasoning gives a new perspective on the future 
public support for welfare policy. The prospect is that future support will not only depend on 
the future configuration of class-interests, self-interests, ethnic homogeneity, or shift in 
egalitarian values. It will also depend on the institutions in place. Within this perspective the 
increased use of selective welfare policies, increased levels of inequality, and increased 
deregulation of labour markets, are indeed worrying developments for those could want to 
uphold public support for welfare policy in the long-run.  
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Notes
                                                 
1
 The studies that find a regime pattern primarily use the ISSP items that measure whether it 
should be a public responsibility to ‘provide job for all’, ‘provide everyone a guaranteed basic 
income’, and ‘reduce income differences’. See Larsen 2006, p. 25-44, for a further discussion.  
3
 This argument is in line with Goul Andersen’s findings on the Danish case. He shows that 
even if we delimit the analyses to the group of private employees without own or family 
experience of unemployment, there is no majority against the welfare policy in general. He 
also shows that support for increased public expenditures in a given area is not higher among 
employees working in this area (Goul Andersen, forthcoming). 
4
 Now the question is how this reasoning applies to the welfare policy conducted by the ideal 
type conservative regime. In terms of expected support for welfare policy, the previous 
empirical studies simply put – without much further discussion - the conservative regimes in 
between the ‘extreme’ liberal and social democratic welfare regimes. On a scale between 
universalism and selectivism is fair to place the conservative regimes in between but a 
number of more substantial argument can be made (see Larsen 2006, p. 45-64). 
6
 However, one also could argue that if the pursued welfare policy – following whatever 
principle – manages to provide (potentially) poor and unemployed groups with good life 
conditions one should expect the public to make tougher judgements about the fulfilment of 
the need criterion. Therefore figure 1 includes a dotted arrow to the need criterion. Thus, we 
probably have a ‘second order’ feedback process on deservingness that restrain what above 
seemed to be self-reinforcing ‘first order’ feedback processes. Nevertheless, in order to 
explain the regime pattern in public support for welfare policy it is fair to assume that the first 
order ‘identity effect’ is more relevant than the second order ‘need effect’. 
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